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THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
CYBERSPACE: FREE SPEECH AS
TECHNOLOGY'S HAND-MAIDEN
Mark S. Kende*

I. INTRODUCfiON
On June 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first
1
case involving cyberspace, Reno v. ACLU. The Court ruled
2
that the Communication Decency Act (CDA), a federal law
that bans the communication on the Internet of indecent speech
aimed at children, violates the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech.
The question of what free speech rights exist in cyberspace
has been aptly described as a "battle of the analogies." Under
the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, free
speech rights vary with the technological medium through which
the speech is expressed. The Court has been the most solicitous
of speech from the print media (like newspapers and magazines)
and the least respectful of broadcast speech (from television or
radio ). 3 The question then becomes: Is expression on the Inter* Associate Professor of Law at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 217 S. Capitol Ave., P.O. Box 13038, Lansing, Ml 48901, (517)371-5140; kendem@mlc.lib.mi.us.
This commentary is partly based on an address that I made to the Michigan Academy of
Science, Arts & Letters Annual Meeting at Calvin College on March 22, 1997. Much of
this article's discussion of Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996), appeared previously on-line as: The Impact of Cyberspace on the First Amendment, 1 Va. J. of Law & Technology 7 (1997)
<http://scs.student.virginia.edu/-vjolt/voll/kende.htmb. Special thanks to Professor
Stephen Sheppard for his thoughtful suggestions on this article.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
2. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)-(h) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
3. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(Florida's right to reply statute requiring newspapers to give political candidates a right
to respond to criticism was struck down under the First Amendment) with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC fairness doctrine requiring T.V.
broadcasters to permit politicians an opportunity to respond to criticism from a T.V. sta-
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net more like print, or like T.V. broadcasts, or like some other
medium, such as telephones? The Supreme Court discussed this
issue in ACLU.
This commentary deals mainly with a different but related
question that is less examined: What effect will cyberspace have
on how the Supreme Court views the First Amendment? One
way to start answering that question is to compare ACLU with a
Supreme Court decision from the 1995-96 term involving indecent speech on cable television, Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC
At first glance, the two decisions appear to conflict. In
Denver, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a plurality opinion advocating a non-categorical "wait and see" approach to free speech
cases involving new technologies. In ACLU, however, the Court
ruled decisively that the CDA's restriction on Internet indecency was subject to strict scrutiny which it failed to pass.
Moreover, none of our current free speech theories seem
able to reconcile these cases. These include the marketplace,
self-fulfillment, social outlet, and political theories of free
speech. My view, however, is that these two cases can be reconciled once it is understood that the Supreme Court is developing
a new model of free speech analysis in Internet-related cases.
The Court's new model can best be described as the
"technology-driven" First Amendment because it is more concerned with preserving the development of new telecommunication technologies like the Internet than with the niceties of First
Amendment doctrine. This commentary shows how the Court
has started to develop this new First Amendment model, and offers several criticisms of how the Court is employing the new
model.
II. THE DENVER CASE
The Denver case examined the constitutionalit¥ of three
provisions of a federal law regulating cable television. The first
tion is upheld under the First Amendment). There is also a lengthy discussion of the
reasons why restrictions on broadcast get more lenient First Amendment scrutiny in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994). See also
Norman Redlich, et. al., Understanding Constitutional Law 349 (Matthew Bender, 1995)
("At the very least, the cases reaffirm that the Court treats the broadcast media and
print media differently .... ").
4. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
5. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
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provision authorized cable operators to ban indecent programming on their leased access channels (the "ban" provision)."
The second provision required those cable operators who permit
such indecent programming to segregate it onto one channel,
and to block its availability until the cable subscriber requests it
(the "segregate and block" provision). 7 Finally, the law permitted cable operators to prohibit indecent programming on public
access channels (the "public access" provision). Indecent speech
was defined in the law as programming depicting "sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as
measured by contemporary community standards." 8
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the "ban" provision, but struck down the "segregate and block" and the "public
access" provisions. In upholding the provision that lets cable
operators ban indecent material, Justice Breyer wrote a plurality
opinion that was extraordinary in several respects. He explicitly
refused to select either a definitive level of scrutiny or a category in which to place free speech regulations of indecent material on cable television. 9 He based this refusal on a view that any
choice of a First Amendment category today for this dynamic
technology would be based on assumptions that will be rendered
obsolete by further innovations. 10 He did not want the Court inadvertently to block these innovations.
Moreover, despite saying that he was not selecting a level of
scrutiny or a category, Breyer created a new default standard of
review called "close judicial scrutiny," which he said underlay
the Court's various speech cases. 11 Using this approach, he said
that the cable law could not be sustained unless the government
could demonstrate that the law "properly addresse[d] an extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the
relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech." 12
Breyer upheld the ban provision by reasoning that it restored to private cable operators some limited editorial freedom
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, § IO(a), !O(b), and IO(c), codified at 47 USC §§53! note, 532
(1994 ).
6. Id. at§ IO(a).
7. ld. at§ lO(b).
8. Id. at§ 10(a)(2).
9. Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116
S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
10. Id. at 2384-85.
II. ld.
12. Id. at 2385.
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and authority over indecent programming-authority they
would possess in the absence of governmental cable regulations.13 Thus, the ban was a flexible law, not a mandatory governmental prohibition. He further found the state had a powerful interest in preventing children from seeing this material and
that the provision was not vague. 14
Breyer then struck down the seRregate and block provision
as being too rigid and burdensome. The segregate and block
provision limited cable operators to showing indecent material
on one channel and required blocking regardless of the circumstances of the customer. Under this provision, a customer who
wrote to his cable company seeking to view the indecent leased
access channel might also have to wait up to 30 days for no good
reason before the cable company unblocked that channel.
Breyer said this waiting period was too restrictive given the
availability of other technologies, such as the V -chip. 16
Breyer also struck down the third provision, which permitted cable operators to ban indecent programming on public access channels. Breyer reasoned that this provision was not justified since there was insufficient evidence to prove that indecent
programming was a problem on such channels, especially since
municipal governments or their agents usuanx regulate the content of the material on such channels anyway. 7
Justice David Souter wrote a concurrence indicating that
the Court should not yet decide on a definitive standard for
newer technologies in order to "do no harm" to technological
innovation. 18 To support his position, Souter explained that the
Court had caused great confusion by stumbling around for 16
years in the obscenity area before settling on the Miller v. Cali19
fornia standard. Souter said that the Court should not create
the same problem with these newer technologies by prematurely
adopting an incorrect standard. Souter said that Breyer was
therefore right to rely heavily for support on "direct analog[ies]"

13. ld. at 2387.
14. Id. at 2387-88.
15. ld. at 2394.
16. Jd. at 2392. TheY-chip is a device that can be installed in a TV to enable parents to block out indecent programming.
17. Jd. at 2397.
18. Jd. at 2403 (Souter, J., concurring).
19. Millen-. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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to other specific cases, rather than taking a categorical approach.20
Justice Anthony Kennedy (concurring in part and dissenting in part) strongly disagreed with Breyer's refusal to adopt a
clear standard and stated that Breyer was overly "distracted" by
21
these dazzling new telecommunications technologies. Kennedy
said that the Court should not abandon its First Amendment jurisprudence in such a context but should instead try to apply es22
tablished First Amendment principles to the case.
Kennedy then explained that government regulation of cable television systems had made the leased access channels into
a "designated public forum." 23 Thus, the content-based restrictions of indecent speech on cable, at issue in Denver, should receive the strictest scrutiny and be struck down. Kennedy's public forum analogy could be applied to the Internet as well.
Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion that criticized Justice Kennedy's public forum analogy. Stevens reasoned
that if a medium became an irreversible public forum every time
the government opened it up to the public, that would actually
deter the government from opening the medium and reduce free
speech. Justice Thomas, concurring and dissenting in part, rejected the view that cable programmers or viewers had any free
speech rights at stake in the case. He said that the only parties
with free speech rights were the cable operators, who owned
these systems, and that their rights were not violated because
the law restored their editorial authority.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Although I agree with the result arrived at by Breyer in
Denver regarding the constitutionality of each provision, I believe that Justice Breyer's non-categorical approach reflects how
distracted he is by the Internet, as Justice Kennedy asserted.
Breyer's flexible approach may seem appealing because it resembles the quickly changing world without boundaries of cyberspace, and seems to facilitate that development. It is no accident that the Harvard Law Review Foreword by Professor
Cass Sunstein, which discusses the Denver case, is titled Leaving
20.
21.
22.
23.

Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2402.
ld. at 2406 (Kennedy, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ld. at 2404.
ld. at 2409.
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24

Things Undecided. But Breyer's approach is mistaken for at
least five reasons.
First, the new and changing nature of this technology does
not diminish Breyer's obligation to decide the case or controversy before him on the facts in existence at that time. It seems
as though Breyer was more worried about how his decision
would affect the Internet than he was about the ordinary cable
television case before him. Moreover, the Court cannot wait, in
these technology cases, until some definite moment in the future
when these technologies will stop changing and then suddenly
announce a perfect standard. Technology never stops changing.
And any standard will be imprecise until it is applied in actual
cases.
Second, Breyer's statement that the Court could not select
a definitive standard to govern cable in the Denver case was
strange since only two years earlier, in Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 25 the Court applied an intermediate standard of review to a structural access regulation of cable television. That decision was reaffirmed earlier last term. 26 That
lesser standard would seem appropriate for the ban provision in
the Denver case because that provision did not totally prohibit
indecent speech-the government gave private operators the
authority to make that decision.
Third, Breyer's deliberately indecisive opinion resembles
the Supreme Court's much-criticized 1967 obscenity decision in
27
Redrup v. New York, when a badly divided Court began aperiod of ruling on obscenity cases without agreeing on any standard. The Court in those cases simply counted hands, after
viewing the allegedly obscene films, and if five of the justices felt
that they "knew it when they saw it" then the conviction was
upheld. The Redrup period was one of the Court's darkest and
most lawless days. Breyer's refusal to adopt a standard when
the Court is again divided over sexually explicit speech sounds
eerily familiar.
Ironically, Justice Souter's attempt to distinguish his own
and Breyer's purportedly prudential "do no harm" approach

24. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996 ).
25. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
26. Turner Broadcasting Systems, lnc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997). The case
returned to the Court after having been remanded.
27. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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here from the Supreme Court's 16-year record of flip-flops on
an obscenity standard ignores the striking similarity between the
decisions. The obscenity cases also demonstrate that the Court
can sometimes only arrive at a consensus by initially establishing
a standard, and then revising that standard over time based on
how the test works in the lower courts. This valuable testing and
refining, however, cannot take place if the constitutional standard is left up in the air.
Fourth, Breyer's technology-driven approach has many of
the weaknesses that led the Court only a few years ago to repudiate the trimester framework for assessing the constitutionality
28
of abortion regulations established in Roe v. Wade. The trimester approach was often criticized as more like a medical
code contingent on the latest trends in medical technology than
like constitutional law. Thus, in Planned Parenthood of South29
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court upheld a woman's
right to an abortion but repudiated the trimester system. The
Court said instead that laws restricting abortion before viability
are permissible unless they impose an "undue burden. " 30 The
Court also reasoned that the Casey standard, by avoiding a
technology-driven approach, would end the uncertainty generated by Roe. 31 In contrast to Casey, the Court's refusal to adopt
a clear standard in Denver will only create uncertainty for lower
courts and lawyers. The myriad opinions in this case will exacerbate the problem.
Fifth, Justice Breyer's reliance on direct analogies to other
cases, rather than on categorical standards, provides little guidance as to why certain speech cases with similar facts are supposedly different. Apparently aware of this problem, Breyer
adopts a default standard of review. But the meaning of this
temporary new standard is quite uncertain, unlike the wellestablished categorical standards that the Court could have relied upon. Breyer's use of this default standard is also paradoxical because he maintains that he is not really adopting a standard.
Two defenses of Breyer's approach deserve mention. The
first is from Sunstein's article summarizing the Supreme Court's

2K
29.
(1992).
30.
31.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
!d. at 874.
!d. at 872.
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32

Sunstein essentially argues that the Court best
preserves its legitimacy in a democratic society by not deciding
questions beyond those essential to a case. 33 To some extent,
this could explain Breyer's opinion. But the Denver Court's refusal to decide on a generally applicable standard and its divided
opinions, provide little guidance to lower courts and lawyers.
Thus, over time, the Denver decision is likely to diminish the
Court's legitimacy in the public eye.
A second defense is that Justice Breyer was simply more
honest and candid than most Justices because he admitted that
he was not sure how to decide this question, rather than definitively adopting vague standards. While Breyer may have been
unusually candid, that does not satisfy his expected job requirements. He is expected to establish meaningful legal rules or
standards that lower courts can follow on a consistent basis. 34
He did not do that.
IV. THE ACLU CASE
The ACLU case assessed the constitutionality of two statutory provisions that criminalized indecent speech on the Internet
aimed at minors. The first provision prohibited the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient
under age 18 (the "indecent transmission" provision). 35 The
second section outlawed the knowing sending or displaying of
patently offensive messages in a manner available to a person
36
under 18 (the "patently offensive" display provision). Patently
offensive speech was defined almost identically to indecent
speech in the Denver case. Indecent speech was not defined in
the so-called transmission section.
Congress also established two affirmative defenses. One
protected indecent speakers who took 9ood faith, reasonable,
7
effective actions to restrict minor access. The other protected
those who required proof of age, such as by credit card verification. 38
32. Sunstein, 110 Harv.L.Rev. 4 (cited in note 24).
33. ld.
34. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 91·122 (U. of Chi·
cago Press, 1984); American Bar Association, Judicial Opinion Writing Manual: A
Product of the Appellate Judges Conference (West, 1991).
35. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
36. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
37. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997).
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Justice Stevens began his majority opinion by essentially
repeating the findings of fact made by the three-jud&e district
court as to the dynamic power of the global Internet. He said
that "[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication." 40 Its content "is as diverse
as human thought," and "is thus comparable, from the readers'
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily
available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering
goods and services."4 He further found that cyberspace is
"located in no particular geographical location but available to
42
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet. "
He also described the Internet as the most participatory medium
in history given the low barriers to access and the parity of
speaker and listener.
Justice Stevens' principle reason for finding the CDA unconstitutional was that it "suppresses a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address
to one another." 43 The CDA's bar on indecent speech aimed at
minors chills adult free speech because it is technologically impossible for adults to ensure that minors are not able to see their
speech on the boundaryless Internet.
Justice Stevens also ruled that: (1) the case precedents relied on by the government were inapposite; (2) the Internet is
not as invasive and dangerous as broadcast media, and functions
more like telephones; (3) the CDA had vagueness problems; (4)
the CDA was not well crafted to achieve its asserted goals; (5)
the affirmative defense provisions were essentially useless because feasible low-cost technology to keep children from being
exposed to adult sites does not yet exist; and (6) the CDA could
not be severed to uphold a subpart.
Justice Stevens further acknowledged applying the "most
44
stringent review of [the CDA] provisions" possible because he
saw the CDA functioning as a content-discriminatory speech
45
ban. His opinion reads much like an endorsement of the marketplace theory of unrestricted free speech for adults. He did
not, however, rule that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E. D. Pa. 1996).
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2334 (1997).
!d. at 2335.
!d. at 2335.
!d. at 2346.
!d. at 2343.
!d. at 2346.
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or substantially overbroad. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and
Souter were among those joining his majority.
Justice O'Connor authored a concurring and dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. She agreed
with the majority that the CDA burdened too much adult
speech. But she dissented because she viewed the CDA as a
form of "cyberzoning" akin to a time, place, and manner restriction, not as a content-discriminatory ban. 46 She concluded that
the law was constitutional in part "as applied to a conversation
involving only an adult and one or more minors-e.g. when an
adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the addressee is a minor. ,47
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
At first glance, it is hard to reconcile the positions of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter in support of ACLU's definitive use of strict scrutiny with their support for Denver's philosophy of leaving things undecided. Based on their Denver
opinions, it seems that they should have voted to strike down
the CDA for overbreadth or vagueness, rather than select a rigid
scrutiny level. Three ways to reconcile the Denver and ACLU
cases, however, come to mind. The most persuasive is that the
Court is developing a technology-driven free speech model.
The first explanation is that several members of the Court
changed their views from Denver to ACLU because they were
confronted in ACLU with the district court's detailed findings of
fact about the Internet's operation and its social benefits. In
fact, the ACLU opinion actually reads as if the Court adopted
Justice Kennedy's Denver opinion. The ACLU opinion used
strict scrutiny and treated the Internet like a new public forum.
This explanation has potential, but nowhere in ACLU do these
justices suggest that they were mistaken in Denver.
A second approach is to distinguish the cases factually. The
Court in Denver assessed the constitutionality of a law that restored editorial discretion (a part of free speech) to a heavily
regulated cable industry. By contrast, the Court in ACLU dealt
with an Internet medium that had little history of government
46. Id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part an dissenting in part) ("I write
separately to explain why I view the (CDA) as little more than an attempt by Congress
to create 'adult zones' on the Internet.")
47. Id. at 2355.
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regulation, as well as with a CDA law that was unusually heavyhanded and content discriminatory. It is therefore natural that
the Court would reject Internet censorship. Undoubtedly, these
distinctions help explain the different case results, but they seem
inadequate to explain the similarities.
A third possibility, however, is that the Court in both cases
was driven by the Internet's brilliant capabilities to insulate
technology from government restraint. Thus, unlike earlier
Court decisions that limited regulation of the media, like print,
in order to protect free speech, the Court in the Internet cases
uses free speech principles to protect the medium.
In Denver, for example, the Court disregarded traditional
First Amendment principles by refusing to choose a definite
scrutiny level so as not to curb the dynamism of new telecommunication technologies. In ACLU, the Court chose the most
speech-protective standard possible in order to foster the same
goal. Three factors further support this conclusion: (a) the
Court's emphasis on the facts; (b) the conflict between Justice
Stevens' majority opinion in ACLU and his prior jurisprudence;
and (c) the flawed legal arguments in ACLU.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S EMPHASIS ON THE FACTS

It is impossible to overstate the importance of the district
court's factual findings to the Supreme Court's decision in
ACLU. The Supreme Court gave an encyclopedic recitation of
these findings, embracing the Internet as a positive social force.
This obsession with the facts was unusual because the Court was
ruling on a facial challenge to the law, and facial constitutional
challenges usually are not fact-dependent.
Interestingly, the district court made its findings after having its courtroom wired and after having various experts give it
extended lessons on "surfing the net." Press accounts suggest
the district court judges were dazzled by this display and the
judges' strong sentiments clearly affected the Supreme Court
48
too. Indeed, the district court opinion read more like a manual
on "How to Use the Internet," than like a judicial opinion. 49
48. The New York Times ran an article on the hearings in district court and on how
the courtroom was "wired." Pamela Mendels, Judges Visit Cyberspace Sites in Suit Over
an Indecency Law, New York Times sec. 1 at 12 (May 12, 1996).
49. For example, the district court opinion cited the prices of specific commercial
software options for blocking indecent Internet messages. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824,841 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

476

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:465

The Supreme Court even highlighted, without explanation, an
extraordinary passage of law from Judge Dalzell's district court
opinion in which he said that "Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all. "50
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
Justice Stevens' role as author of the ACLU opinion also
demonstrates that technology was on his mind. Stevens has
authored several First Amendment opinions suggesting that a
category of "low-value" speech should be established that would
permit greater government restriction than for high value political speech. 51 His low-value category would cover sexually explicit speech aimed at minors.
How can one reconcile his ACLU marketplace opinion with
his other opinions recommending a low-value speech category?
The answer is that his ACLU opinion is driven by his obvious
admiration for this new technology. That admiration is the most
logical explanation for why he uses the strict scrutiny standard in
ACLU for sexually explicit speech, which he had previously
treated as low value. The majority's desire to protect the Internet with strict scrutiny also explains why the Court did not
merely strike down the law as vague or overbroad.
C. THE PROBLEMS INTHEACLUOPINION
Although Justice Stevens was quite justified in emphasizing
the Internet's important social benefits and in his assessment of
the CDA's many flaws, he makes three problematic legal arguments which also seem technology-driven.
1. THE VAGUENESS ISSUE

The Court's reasoning on the vagueness issue was bizarre.
Though disclaiming any intent to find the CDA vague, the Court
relied heavily on the supposed ambiguities in the CDA's defini-

50. 117 S. Ct. at 2340 n.30, citing, 929 F. Supp. at 877.
51. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,70-71 (1976):
But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of
our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects communication in this
area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the
content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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tion of "patently offensive" to conclude that the CDA chills
great amounts of speech and therefore acts as a contentdiscriminatory ban, not as a time, place, and manner restriction.52
Yet the CDA's definition of "patently offensive" was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in both FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'3 and Denver. As the district court found in Shea v.
Reno 54 , the Denver decision does not permit a vagueness finding
here. The Court's bootstrapping by finding a law to be contentdiscriminatory, because of vagueness issues, without actually
finding the law to be constitutionally vague is disturbing.
2. UPHOLDING PART OF THE CDA

Stevens also mistakenly rejects the dissent's argument that
the law can constitutionally prohibit an adult from sending an
indecent Internet message solely to a known, specific minor.
Stevens said the dissent's view "would confer broad powers of
censorship in the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any opponent
of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the
would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child ... would be present."55
Yet Stevens' response makes little sense because it advocates striking down a restriction on indecent speech because of
the putative actions of an opponent to indecent speech. Moreover, the dissent's position, that the law is constitutional in part, is
supported by several decisions where the Court found a compelling interest in banning indecent speech directed at minors,
such as in the Denver case and in Ginsberg v. New York. 56
3. COMPARING THE INTERNET TO OTHER MEDIA
The Court's ruling that speech on the Internet deserves
more First Amendment protection than broadcast speech is also
troubling. For example, regarding sexually explicit speech, the
Court said that Internet users "seldom encounter such content
52. In discussing the vagueness issue, the Court said that, "Regardless of whether
the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the First
Amendment." ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
53. 438 u.s. 726 (1978).
54. 930 F. Supp. 916,938 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
55. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2349.
56. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court there upheld a law banning the sale to minors
under age 17 of material considered obscene as to minors, though not for adults.
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accidentally" since the Internet requires affirmative steps to
access material, as compared to simply switching on a television
or radio broadcast. In addition, the Court said that sexually explicit Internet sites typically have warnings that prevent a viewer
from accidental exposure. The Court then indicated that gaining access to sexual material on the Internet was more like using
a phone-sex line because affirmative steps are needed for both.
Yet children surfing the net do come across sexually explicit
speech by accident. Some of the most notorious examples involve sexually crude web locations that hide their content by
using perfectly innocent-and appealing-site names to draw
unsuspecting kids. But the real problem with the Internet is not
accidental discoveries.
The real problem is that bright and curious children, who
are often more skilled at computers than their parents, do not
have the willpower to suppress their curiosity and avoid surveying all sorts of inappropriate material that is seductively displayed on the Internet. In addition, many children "surf the
net" on computers located in their bedrooms where their parents cannot effectively monitor what is being viewed. 5R By contrast, the television is generally watched in an open family area
where any effort by children to watch sexual material can more
easily be stopped. Justice Stevens is also somewhat inconsistent
in ruling that the warnings on Internet sites are effective at
keeping children out, but that age and other screening devices
(the CD A's affirmative defenses) are not effective.
Moreover, the Court does not meaningfully address the
specific dangers posed by the Internet that are not present with
other media. For example, the interactive nature of the Internet
makes it far more dangerous than either broadcast or phone sex
lines. There are stories of children being lured to meet people
59
they speak with on the Internet only to be injured or killed.
Indeed, a television reporter in 1997 pretended to be a child on a
chat line and numerous pedophiles tried to solicit a meeting.w

57. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
58. Anyone who has teenage children knows it is a myth to say that it is easy for
the parent to restrict what the teenager does with the computer in the bedroom.
59. Drake Witham, Kids Easy Prey On-Line, FBI Director Says, Detroit Free Press
18A (Apri!IO, 1997); George Johnson, Old View of Internet: Nerds. New View: Nuts.,
New York Times sec. 4 at I (March 30, 1997) ("Come visit my web site, kiddies, and I'll
give you some candy.")
60. The reporter's experiment was carried out on the television show "Good
Morning America."
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Sexual "speech" is also cruder on the Internet than on
broadcast television. And the explicit visual element of Internet
sexual material makes it far more problematic than phone-sex
lines. Given the likely dynamic convergence of the various mediums over time, the Court might do better to worry about the
special dangers posed by the Internet's multi-dimensional interactive nature rather than obsess about whether affirmative acts
are needed to log on.
D. A RESPONSE
One response to my theory, that the Court has become
technology-driven in the Internet related cases, is that the Court
should have used strict scrutiny in Denver because that would be
more protective of technology than a "wait and see" approach.
Yet this objection actually supports the technology-driven
model.
Use of such a rigid standard there could have potentially
endangered the constitutionality of a law requiring television
manufacturers to install the V -chip; a law designed to ensure
parents can control what their kids watch. Under strict scrutiny,
such a law could be struck down as not being narrowly tailored
61
to ensuring that children are not exposed to this material.
Denver's more flexible approach, however, would seem to facilitate government's role in encouraging technology innovations
that permit private actors, like parents and cable operators, to
decide whether to permit this speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the 21st Century, the U.S. Supreme Court will face difficult First Amendment questions regarding cyberspace, such as
the meaning of contemporary local community standards in obscenity cases and the applicability of the current tests for subversive advocacy. The Denver and ACLU cases suggest that the
Court may permit the First Amendment to be a hand-maiden to
this new technology. The flaws in the Court's reasoning in those
cases, however, show that a technology-driven approach would
be a mistake. The Court should instead remain faithful to sound
First Amendment standards. Given the Internet's dynamism,
61. Benjamin M. Dean, The Age-Based Ratings System: An Unfortunate Response
to the V-Chip Legislation, 4 Va. J. of Soc. Pol. & L. 743, 791 (1997) (discussing the constitutional issues posed by the V-chip law).
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the unprincipled modification of such standards would create
chaos.

